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Abstract
We study how taxable income responds to changes in marginal tax rates, using as a 
main source of identifying variation three large reforms to the Spanish personal income 
tax implemented in the period 1999-2014. The most reliable estimates of the elasticity 
of taxable income (ETI) with respect to the net-of-tax rate for this period are between 0.45 
and 0.64. The ETI is about three times larger for selfemployed taxpayers than for employees, 
and larger for business income than for labor and capital income. The elasticity of broad 
income (EBI) is smaller, between 0.10 and 0.24, while the elasticity of some tax deductions 
such as the one for private pension contributions exceeds one. Our estimates are similar 
across a variety of estimation methods and sample restrictions, and also robust to potential 
biases created by mean reversion and heterogeneous income trends.
Keywords: elasticity of taxable income, ETI, personal income tax, mean reversion, tax 
deductions, Spain.
JEL classifi cation: H24, H31, D63.
Resumen
En este artículo se estudia cómo reacciona la renta gravable de los contribuyentes 
españoles ante cambios en los tipos marginales del IRPF, utilizando como principal 
fuente de identifi cación la variación proporcionada por tres grandes reformas del 
impuesto introducidas a lo largo del período 1999-2014. Las estimaciones más fi ables de 
la elasticidad de la renta gravable con respecto al tipo marginal neto del impuesto para este 
período se sitúan en el rango comprendido entre 0,45 y 0,64. Esta elasticidad es cerca 
de tres veces mayor para los contribuyentes autónomos que para los trabajadores, y es 
mayor para las rentas procedentes de las actividades económicas que para las rentas del 
trabajo y del capital. La elasticidad de la renta bruta es menor, entre 0,10 y 0,24, mientras 
que la elasticidad de algunas deducciones como las de planes de pensiones privados excede 
de 1. Las estimaciones obtenidas son similares cuando se utiliza una amplia variedad de 
métodos de estimación y restricciones muestrales, y también son robustas frente a los 
sesgos potenciales creados por la presencia de reversión a la media y heterogeneidad en 
las tendencias de renta entre contribuyentes.
Palabras clave: elasticidad de la renta gravable, impuesto sobre la renta personal, reversión 
a la media, deducciones fi scales, España.
Códigos JEL: H24, H31, D63.
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1 Introduction
The impact of personal income taxes on the economic decisions of individuals is a key
empirical question with important implications for the optimal design of tax policy. Not
surprisingly, the modern public finance literature has devoted significant efforts to study
behavioral responses to changes in taxes on reported taxable income, as reviewed by
(Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012). Most of this work focuses on the elasticity of taxable
income (ETI), which captures a broad set of real and reporting behavioral responses
to taxation. Indeed, reported taxable income reflects not only individuals’ decisions on
hours worked, but also work effort and career choices as well as the results of investment
and entrepreneurship activities. Besides these real responses, the ETI also captures tax
evasion and avoidance decisions of individuals to reduce their tax bill.
In this paper, we estimate the elasticity of taxable income in Spain, an interesting
country to study because during the last two decades it has implemented several major
personal income tax reforms, plus a variety of smaller legislative changes, including the
ability of regional governments to modify the tax schedule. Due to data availability,
we focus on the reforms implemented in the period 1999-2014, which provide useful
variation to identify the ETI. We consider all legislative changes in the personal income
tax, although identification mainly comes from three major reforms. In particular, the
2003 reform lowered the top marginal tax rate (45 to 43 percent) and also reduced
the marginal rate for the bottom bracket (18 to 15 percent). The 2007 reform was an
overhaul of the income tax system, turning the standard personal deduction into a tax
credit, which increased the progressivity of the tax. It also modified the definition of tax
bases, shifting a substantial part of capital income from the “general” to the “savings”
tax base and thereby lowering the marginal rate on capital income. Finally, the 2012
reform, introduced in the middle of a severe recession, increased tax rates across the
board, pushing the top marginal rate up to 52 percent (further increased to 56 percent
in some regions, like Andalusia and Catalonia).
The empirical literature on the ETI has stressed two challenges that could prevent
obtaining consistent estimates of this parameter: mean reversion and heterogeneous
income trends. Mean reversion is due to transitory shocks to income. When taxpayers
receive a transitory income shock in a given year, they tend to revert to their permanent
income in subsequent years. This makes it difficult to disentangle changes in reported
income due to mean reversion from changes induced by tax reforms. Moreover, the
potential bias due to mean reversion has opposite signs for tax cuts and tax increases.
The impact of mean reversion is particularly acute in the top and bottom tails of the
income distribution, affecting taxpayers with low and high permanent income, who are
precisely the groups often targeted by tax reforms.
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Heterogeneous income trends across groups of taxpayers differently affected by tax
reforms are problematic for similar reasons. Much of the discussion in the literature has
centered around the increase in income inequality in the US in the 1980s (documented by
Piketty and Saez, 2003), because many papers in this literature evaluate the reduction
in the top marginal rate in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. In that setting, it is hard to
disentangle whether increases in taxable income by top earners are caused by the tax
reform or by the underlying trend toward higher inequality. In the case of Spain, the
existence of secular income trends seems less problematic for the estimation of the ETI, as
there has been no comparable increase in income inequality over the period under study.
However, the asymmetric impact of the Great Recession across groups of taxpayers could
also create challenges for identification.
In the empirical anlysis, we use an administrative panel dataset of income tax returns
compiled by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF) with information provided by the
Spanish Tax Agency (AEAT). The panel is a random stratified sample with 8.1 million
observations over the period 1999-2014 (about 3 percent of each year’s income tax re-
turns). It contains detailed information on the main components of each income source
(labor, capital and self-employment), income-related deductions, the legal tax bases, de-
tails on a broad range of tax credits and the overall tax liability for each taxpayer. We
use this information to construct a stable definition of taxable income over time. This
homogenization is necessary to provide consistent estimates of the ETI for a long period
such as 1999-2014 during which significant tax base changes were introduced (e.g. 2007
reform). Since the marginal tax rate (MTR) is not contained in the data, we construct
our own tax calculator (in the spirit of the NBER’s TAXSIM for the US) to calculate the
MTR for each taxpayer, and also to build the predicted-tax rate instruments described
below. We calculate the MTR as a weighted average of the MTR applicable to each
income source (labor, financial capital, real-estate capital, business income and capital
gains).
We use various panel-based two-stage least squares (2SLS) diff-in-diff estimators to
obtain consistent estimates of the ETI. The baseline instrument is the predicted change in
the net-of-tax rate, defined assuming that income stays constant (in real terms) between
a pair of years. This instrument has been used extensively in the literature dating back to
Gruber and Saez (2002). Identification comes from heterogeneous changes in the personal
income tax schedule across groups of taxpayers due to tax reforms. In all regressions, we
control for socio-demographic characteristics of taxpayers (e.g., age, gender, geographic
location and indicators for joint filing, children and old-age dependents) that proxy for
their permanent income. The presence of mean reversion and heterogeneous income
trends in the data motivates the inclusion of nonlinear functions of base-year income,
aiming to resolve the potential biases introduced in the estimates. As we discuss in more
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detail below, we also use state-of-the-art estimation methods proposed by Kleven and
Schultz (2014) and Weber (2014) to deal with these identification challenges.
We begin the empirical analysis by examining the existence of mean reversion and
heterogeneous income trends in Spain over the 1999-2014 period. Mean reversion is
present at the bottom and top tails of the income distribution, which makes it essential
to account for mean reversion in the regression analysis. Regarding changes in the
income distribution, we show that top income shares have been relatively stable in Spain.
This suggests that the existence of secular income trends across groups of taxpayers
differentially affected by tax reforms is not a first-order concern in this context.
Our first set of estimates corresponds to an unbalanced panel of taxpayers for the
entire period 1999-2014. We obtain estimates of the ETI around 0.35 using the Gruber
and Saez (2002) estimation method, 0.54 using Kleven and Schultz (2014)’s method
and 0.64 using Weber (2014)’s method. This response is robust to the inclusion of
nonlinear controls of base-year income in alternative specifications to deal with mean
reversion. We undertake several sensitivity tests showing that these estimates are robust
to the consideration of alternative base-year income thresholds commonly used in the
literature, the examination of permanent taxpayers (balanced panel), the inclusion of
pensioners, or the exclusion of taxpayers that change their regional fiscal residence during
the period of analysis. These baseline ETI estimates are comparable to the “consensus”
estimates obtained for the US (Gruber and Saez, 2002; Weber, 2014) and other European
countries such as Germany (Doerrenberg, Peichl and Siegloch, 2017), but higher than
those obtained for Denmark (Kleven and Schultz, 2014).
In addition to the average estimates of the ETI, we analyze heterogeneous responses
across groups of taxpayers and sources of income. The results on the anatomy of the
response are in line with the predictions from the literature. As expected, stronger
responses are documented for groups of taxpayers with higher ability to respond. In par-
ticular, self-employed taxpayers have a higher ETI than wage employees, while real-estate
capital and business income respond more strongly than labor income. The elasticity
of broad income (EBI) is between 0.10 and 0.24, substantially lower than the ETI, in-
dicating that deductions play a significant role in taxpayers’ responses. Indeed, we find
large responses on the tax deductions margin, especially private pension contributions.
Nevertheless, the EBI is relevant in quantitative terms, particularly for self-employed
taxpayers, suggesting that there may be real labor supply responses to taxation or eva-
sion behavior that go through reported broad income.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the large literature on the
ETI, including earlier estimates for Spain. Section 3 describes the Spanish personal
income tax and the main tax reforms in the period 1999-2014, and also describes the
administrative panel dataset used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 provides a sim-
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ple conceptual framework and discusses our estimation strategy to obtain consistent
estimates of the ETI. Section 5 reports the main empirical results and the sensitivity
analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relation to the Existing Literature on the ETI
A large body of research has attempted to estimate the elasticity of taxable income.
Although the most influential works focus on the US personal income tax, there are
estimates available for an increasing number of advanced economies. As a result of this
body of research, meta-analyses of the ETI estimates for a variety of countries have been
conducted by Neisser (2017) and Klemm et al. (2018).
In one of the seminal papers in this literature, Feldstein (1995) used a sample of
US income tax returns from 1985 and 1988 to study responses to the 1986 Tax Reform
Act (TRA). He estimated a very large elasticity, between 1 and 3, which would put the
US on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. Later studies, using an extended dataset for
the period 1979-1990 in the US and more sophisticated regression techniques, revised
these estimates downward to about 0.4 (Auten and Carroll, 1999; Gruber and Saez,
2002). These studies take into account two econometric challenges largely ignored in
Feldstein (1995): a trend towards higher income inequality that was unrelated to tax
reforms and the existence of substantial mean reversion in taxable income over time.
This literature has been extensively summarized by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012),
concluding that the “best available estimates [of the ETI in the US] range from 0.12 to
0.40” (p. 42). The literature also examined the anatomy of the response in the US, which
results in small elasticities of broad income (EBI), around 0.1, indicating that most of
the taxpayers’ reaction is through itemization rather than real or reporting responses in
gross income. Furthermore, the empirical literature documents a much stronger response
of taxpayers with a broader scope to react (e.g., self-employed vs. wage employees) and
larger reactions in specific sources of income such as capital and business income.
Regarding the intepretation of the ETI, Feldstein (1999) established the conditions
under which the ETI is a sufficient statistic to evaluate the efficiency cost of the income
tax. The argument rests on the idea that responses to income taxation include behav-
iors like evasion and avoidance, not only labor supply responses. Focusing on taxable
income as the outcome variable allows us to estimate the overall response, even if some
of these components are hard to measure directly. Chetty (2009) qualified Feldstein’s
argument pointing out that, if evasion and avoidance behaviors lead to transfer costs to
other agents, the estimated ETI is no longer a sufficient statistic. Doerrenberg, Peichl
and Siegloch (2017) present a similar theoretical framework to examine the role of tax
deductions, and provide evidence that reported deductions are highly responsive to tax
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changes in Germany. Finally, Gillitzer and Slemrod (2016) discuss the conditions under
which Feldstein’s original result would still hold, restating the argument in terms of fiscal
externalities. This research stressed the relevance of examining the different channels of
taxpayers’ response to tax changes, such as the use of tax deductions or the anatomy of
the response inferred from gross income changes.
In an early critique of this literature, Slemrod (1992, 1998) pointed out that the ETI
is not a stable parameter (neither over time nor across countries), and stressed the idea
that government policy can have an effect on the ETI. For example, wide availability of
tax deductions and exemptions is likely to lead to a larger elasticity of taxable income,
all else equal. Similar arguments are made by Kopczuk (2005), who also warns about
focusing only on marginal tax rate changes, when most reforms simultaneously modify
the definition of the tax base. Taking these insights together, the literature highlighted
the need to provide estimates on both the anatomy and the heterogeneity of the response
of taxpayers, keeping a definition of taxable income stable over the period under analysis.
Some recent work has challenged the “consensus” empirical strategies from Saez,
Slemrod and Giertz (2012), proposing alternative estimation techniques. Weber (2014)
shows that the Gruber-Saez instrument is endogenous because it is correlated with recent
income shocks. She proposes using further lags of taxable income to construct the
predicted net-of-tax rate instrument, as these lags are less correlated with current income
shocks and provide more credible identification. Applying her method to the same
dataset used by Gruber and Saez (2002), she estimates a larger elasticity in the range
between 0.68 and 0.86. This elasticity is similar in order of magnitude to the baseline
ETI estimate for Germany obtained following Weber’s proposal in Doerrenberg, Peichl
and Siegloch (2017) which is in the range of 0.54 to 0.68. In contrast, the estimate of
the EBI (0.47) reported in Weber (2014) is larger than the EBI estimates obtained in
Doerrenberg, Peichl and Siegloch (2017), with estimates between 0.16 and 0.28. Using
time-series methods and a “narrative” approach to describe post-war tax reforms in the
US, Mertens and Olea (2018) estimate a substantially larger ETI of around 1.2, with
an even larger elasticity for high-income earners and a positive and significant elasticity
elsewhere in the income distribution.
In another influential study, Kleven and Schultz (2014) apply a refinement of the
Gruber-Saez estimation strategy, adding an instrument for virtual income to separately
estimate income effects. They analyze a series of income tax reforms in Denmark, arguing
that estimating the ETI using a longer period and the variation of multiple tax reforms
is a more reliable empirical strategy to identify causal effects of taxes than the usual one-
reform analysis. Additionally, the authors stress the suitability of examining economies
less affected by the ususual empirical challenges to identify the ETI such as Denmark
where income distribution has been stable over time and tax changes affected different
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parts of the income distribution, reducing the potential bias from mean reversion. They
estimate the ETI and EBI for overall income, and also separately for labor and capital
income, finding consistently small values between 0.05 and 0.2.
Existing Estimates of the ETI for Spain
in contrast with the standard three-year interval used in the literature to avoid captur-
ing income-shifting responses that bias estimates. Therefore, these estimates should be
interpreted with caution.1
Our paper departs from the earlier literature on the ETI in Spain by considering
a much longer time period (1999-2014) over which multiple tax reforms took place,
including both tax cuts and tax increases. This provides much richer identifying vari-
ation, allowing us to obtain more consistent estimates of the ETI. Besides the longer
period of analysis, we adopt state-of-the-art methodological approaches to estimate the
ETI, simultaneously dealing with the multiple threats to identification. In particular,
we present estimates using the Gruber and Saez (2002) three-year difference estimator
as a baseline, and compare them to the results obtained with the methods proposed by
Kleven and Schultz (2014) and Weber (2014). In addition to this, we present evidence on
1Other estimates of the ETI in Spain are available in working paper form or published as think tank
reports (Badenes, 2001; Díaz-Mendoza, 2004; Onrubia and Sanz-Sanz, 2009; Arrazola et al., 2014).
As noted above, estimates of the ETI are available for most advanced countries and
Spain is no exception. However, only a few of the existing studies have been published in
peer-reviewed journals (Sanmartín, 2007; Sanz-Sanz et al., 2015; Díaz-Caro and Onrubia,
2018). Sanmartín (2007) exploits the income tax reforms of 1988 and 1989, which lowered
substantially the top marginal rate and allowed married couples to file two individual
declarations. Following the empirical strategy proposed by Auten and Carroll (1999), he
constructs a predicted-tax-rate instrument using data for the years 1987 and 1990 and
obtains ETI estimates between 0.1 and 0.2. One caveat about these estimates is that
the empirical strategy may lead to a downward bias in the ETI estimates when studying
a tax cut in the presence of mean reversion.
Both Sanz-Sanz et al. (2015) and Díaz-Caro and Onrubia (2018) exploit the 2007 in-
come tax reform. Sanz-Sanz et al. (2015) estimate the elasticity of gross income (EGI),
rather than taxable income, using the standard predicted-tax-rate instrument. They
estimate an EGI between 0.55 and 0.68 (depending on the base-year income controls),
which is higher than other estimates of the EGI in the literature. Díaz-Caro and Onrubia
(2018) use a stable definition of taxable income before and after the 2007 reform to esti-
mate the ETI. They obtain point estimates between 0.41 and 0.43 and provide estimates
for different groups of taxpayers. Notice that focusing the identification on the 2007 tax
reform is problematic because the tax base was substantially modified, along with the
marginal rate schedule. Moreover, both papers use data only for years 2006 and 2007,
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3.1 The Spanish Personal Income Tax
During the period analyzed in this paper, 1999-2014, the Spanish personal income tax
(PIT) has been structured in two separate tax bases: a “general” tax base comprising a
broad definition of taxable income taxed with a progressive schedule, and a “special” tax
base comprising specific income sources taxed with a flat-rate schedule. Until 2006, the
special tax base included only some types of capital gains. In 2007, it was renamed the
“savings” tax base and additional components of capital income were added, as explained
in more detail in Section 3.2.
Taxable income in the general tax base is computed in several steps. The first step is
to sum the gross income from each income source.2 Second, the income-related expendi-
tures (required to earn that income) are subtracted from each income source, resulting
in the adjusted gross income (AGI). Third, income-specific deductions are subtracted
2The full list of income sources contained in the general tax base includes: labor income, business
income, real-estate capital income, financial capital income, some components of capital gains and other
income sources such as imputed and attributed rents.
from each AGI to obtain the taxable income for each source.
As an example, taxable labor income results from adding the gross income earned
by workers (e.g., wages and salaries, bonus, in-kind payments) and subtracting income-
related expenditures, such as payroll taxes for wage employees, and then substracting
income-specific deductions (e.g., the general reduction for labor income). The process is
the same for other income sources.3 After computing taxable incomes from all sources
and adding them up, a set of general deductions is subtracted to obtain the general
taxable income, which is taxed with a progressive tax schedule.4
The special (savings, since 2007) tax base is taxed at a preferential tax rate, targeted
at particular components of capital income.5 In the period 1999-2006, the preferential
3Other relevant income-related expenditures are the reported inputs acquisitions for entrepreneurs or
housing expenses for landlords. Each income source has its own set of deductions and implementation
rules. For instance, deductions for irregular financial capital, the deduction for home rentals or the
deductions desinged to promote entrepreneurial activity and employment.
4Some examples of general deductions are those associated to personal and family circumstances
(individual allowance, joint filing, number of children and dependents), the deduction for contributions
to private pension plans and allowances related to past negative tax liabilities.
5The flat tax rate was 17 percent in 1999, 18 percent from 2000 to 2002, 15 percent from 2003 to
2006, again 18 percent since 2007 until 2010 when certain progressivity was included. See Section 3.2
and online Appendix A for more details.
3 Institutional Background and Data
the responsiveness of tax deductions, following Doerrenberg, Peichl and Siegloch (2017),
and estimate the elasticity for different sources of income, as done by Kleven and Schultz
(2014). These estimates are subject to a comprehensive set of sensitivity analsysis to
show the robustness of the reported ETI estimates for Spain.
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tax rate was applied only to long-term capital gains, while in 2007-2014 special taxable
income included capital gains derived from the transmission of assets as well as the
main component of financial capital income (i.e., income from interests and dividends).
Taxable income in this case results from subtracting the remnant of deductions not
applied in the general tax base, as well as allowances for past capital losses.
The application of the progressive tax schedule to the general tax base and the
flat rate to the special/savings tax base yields, respectively, the general and the spe-
cial/savings tax liability. The aggregate tax liability from these two tax bases is further
reduced by the application of several tax credits, resulting in the tax due. The most rel-
evant tax credits in quantitative terms are the mortgage interest tax credit for primary
dwellings, the tax credit for the birth or adoption of children, the e400 stimulus tax
credit in effect in 2008 and 2009, and the refundable maternity tax credit for working
mothers with children below three years, established in 2003.6
The legislative power to rule and reform the personal income tax law has traditionally
been assigned to the Spanish parliament, which designs the structure and main features
6Apart from these, there is a broad set of smaller (in revenue terms) tax credits for house renting,
double taxation, business investment and charitable donations. A complementary discussion of the
structure of the Spanish PIT and its main components can be found in García-Miralles, Guner and
Ramos (2019).
of the tax (often following the initiative of the central government). However, since 1997
regional parliaments have progressively obtained legislative capacity (extended in 2002
and 2010) to introduce changes in the tax schedule for the general base, modifications in
the personal and family deductions, and also the ability to introduce new tax credits. In
spite of the regional dimension of the tax, the PIT is administered at the national level
in a unique tax return by the Spanish Tax Agency.7
3.2 Tax Reforms
The specific definition of the components that determine tax bases as well as the tax
rates applied to taxable income have been subject to substantial modifications over time.
These changes are due to major reforms of the PIT but also to significant changes passed
in the annual Budget Law and measures included in other bills.8 The core reforms of the
PIT that provide us with useful identifying variation were put into force in 2003, 2007
and 2012 fiscal years (note that the fiscal year coincides with the calendar year). We
also consider changes in the general tax schedule at the regional level. These regional
changes were modest until 2010, when in the context of the European Sovereign Debt
7For historical reasons, the autonomous communities of the Basque Country and Navarre (which
account for six percent of Spain’s population), have the power to design, collect and enforce their own
PIT. For this reason, they are not included in this study.
8See online Appendix A for references to the bills that introduced the major tax reforms in the
Spanish personal income tax as well as a simplified description of other relevant legislative tax changes
also considered in the empirical analysis.
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Crisis regional parliaments became more active in creating new brackets with higher
marginal tax rates for top-income earners (see discussion in Tax Reforms Appendix).
These two sets of changes in the PIT constitute the identifying variation that we use to
estimate the elasticity of taxable income for the period 1999-2014.
The 2003 Reform reduced the top marginal tax rate from 48 to 45 percent (a 6.25-
percent cut) and the lowest marginal rate from 18 to 15 percent (a 20-percent cut).
The top panels of Figure 1 depict the changes in the marginal tax rate (MTR, left)
and average tax rate (ATR, right) by levels of taxable income. The reform reduced the
number of tax brackets (from six to five) and was particularly beneficial for taxpayers
with taxable income between e40,460 and e45,000, as they experienced a 16.7 percent
reduction in their marginal tax rate (from 45 to 37 percent). The tax rate on capital
gains was also reduced from 18 to 15 percent. Besides the lower marginal tax rates, the
reform expanded the amounts of the personal and family deductions. The most relevant
change in tax credits was the introduction of a new refundable cash-credit for working
mothers with children below three years that could reach e1200 per year. The ex-ante
revenue impact of this pro-cyclical reform was significant with an estimated permanent
tax revenue reduction equivalent to 0.50 percent of GDP in 2003 Gil et al. (2019).9
The 2007 Reform was a significant overhaul that modified both the definition of
taxable income in the two tax bases and the overall tax structure. The two most relevant
changes were (i) moving most financial capital income from the general to the savings
tax base, and (ii) converting the personal and family exemptions (with the exception of
the deduction for joint filing) into a tax credit from the general tax liability, rather than
a deduction from the tax base. Regarding (i), income from interest and dividends went
from being taxed at 45 percent in the general base to being taxed at the 18 percent flat
rate in the savings base (a 60-percent reduction in the MTR). This implied a dramatic
reduction in the marginal tax rate for medium and high-income taxpayers with substan-
tial financial income. Notice that this modification could also imply lower marginal rates
for additional income obtained from other sources such as labor, real-estate or business
income. The reform also expanded the definition of capital gains taxed under the savings
tax base, including all gains from the transmission of assets regardless of the period over
which the gain was generated.10 Regarding (ii), the new way to calculate tax liability
consisted of applied the progressive tax schedule to general taxable income and the per-
sonal and family exemption separately, and then subtracting the two resulting amounts.
9Gil et al. (2019) estimate the ex-ante tax revenue impact of all recent PIT reforms in Spain based on
a narrative description of the reforms, using detailed information reported by the Spanish Tax Agency.
10Before this reform, capital gains derived from the transmission of assets whose generation period
was inferior to one year (two years in 1999-2000) were included in the general tax base. From 2007 to
2012, only residual capital gains not associated to the transmission of assets, e.g., net changes in wealth,
were included in the general tax base. In 2013, short-term capital gains (up to one year) derived from
assets transmission were include again in the general tax base.
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Notice that this change increased the progressivity of the tax schedule, because in the
new system all taxpayers with the same personal and family characteristics obtain the
same reduction in tax liability, while in the case of a deduction tax liability decreases in
proportion to each taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.
It the 2007 reform, the number of brackets in the progressive tax schedule for the
general tax base was reduced from five to four. For example, a small bracket with a 15-
percent rate that applied to incomes up to e4,161.6 in 2006 was eliminated and replaced
by a larger bracket for incomes up to e17,700 taxed at a 24-percent rate. The reform
also expanded a tax bracket for middle income, reducing the marginal tax rate in the
range e26,842.3-e32,360.6 by 32.1 percent (from 37 to 28 percent). Similarly, income
between e46,810 and e52,360.6 experienced a 21.6 percent reduction in the marginal
tax rate (from 45 to 37 percent). Finally, the top marginal rate was also reduced by 4.7
percent (from 45 to 43 percent). The ex-ante revenue impact of this reform is estimated
to imply a reduction of permanent tax revenue equivalent to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2007
(Gil et al., 2019).
The 2012 Reform consisted of a general increase of marginal tax rates for all tax-
payers, increasing the progressivity of the tax schedule in both the general and savings
tax bases. In 2011, the central government had already introduced two additional brack-
ets with higher marginal tax rates for top income earners: 44 percent for taxable income
between e120,000 and e175,000 and 45 percent for taxable income above the latter
amount. On the same year, some regional governments modified their tax schedules as
well, reaching a top marginal rate of 49 percent in Andalusia and Catalonia. The 2012
reform increased the marginal tax rates for all brackets: by 3.1 percent for the first, 7.1
percent for the second, 8.1 percent for the third, 9.3 percent for the fourth, 11.4 percent
for the fifth, 13.3 percent for the sixth and 15.6 percent for the newly-created seventh
bracket (for taxable income above e300,000). The pre- and post-reform tax schedules
are shown in the bottom panels of Figure 1. The reform also increased the tax rates
on savings income, introducing some progressivity on the savings tax schedule. Savings
income up to e6,000 was now taxed at 21 percent, a second bracket up to e24,000 at 25
percent, and any savings income above that at 27 percent. The ex-ante estimated tax
revenue impact of this pro-cyclical reform was 0.50 percent of GDP in 2012 (Gil et al.,
2019).
3.3 Data
We use an administrative panel dataset of income tax returns compiled by the Instituto
de Estudios Fiscales (Pérez, Villanueva and Molinero, 2018) with information provided
by the the Spanish Tax Agency (Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria, AEAT).
This panel contains a random sample of about 3 percent of all income tax returns filed
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in Spain in the period 1999-2014.11 The sample is stratified by gross income level (10
categories), region (15 autonomous communities and the two autonomous cities of Ceuta
and Melilla) and a binary indicator of the main source of income (whether labor is the
main income source or not) based on information from 2003 (the base year). To mitigate
panel attrition, going forward and backward in time, taxpayers that drop out from the
panel are replaced by new filers in their same income-region-source stratum.
11Except for those from the Basque Country and Navarre, as explained in footnote 7.
The dataset contains more than 8.1 million tax returns (about 500,000 per year, on
average), with a larger sample in the more recent years reflecting the increase in the
total number of taxpayers. Each tax return is associated with a sampling weight that
represents the inverse of the probability of being selected. Using these weights, the
yearly aggregates of the main gross income and tax base and liability magnitudes are
representative of the ones reported in the universe of the population (see Onrubia, Picos
and Pérez, 2011, for more details).
The dataset contains detailed information on the main components of all income
sources, income-related deductions of type of income, the rights and effective tax exemp-
tion of each deduction, the legal tax bases, disaggregated information on a broad range
of tax credits and the overall tax liability. In terms of socio-demographic characteristics,
we observe gender, date of birth, province and city of residence. Besides, the information
in the tax return data allows us to infer the number of children and dependents that
each taxpayer is responsible for. Table 1 in the online appendix reports the share of
income due to each income source (left panel) and the share of income received by each
category of taxpayer (right panel). About 80 percent of income reported in the Spanish
PIT is labor income, 8.9 percent capital income, 8.3 percent business income and 3.9 per-
cent capital gains. If we classify taxpayers into different categories based on their most
important source of income, we observe that wage employees account for 82 percent of
the tax returns analyzed. Self-employed taxpayers represent 7.8 percent of the sample,
although it is worth noting that only two-thirds of these (5.2 percent of the total) are
under the direct estimation regime. The rest of self-employed taxpayers are in the “ob-
jective estimation” or agricultural regimes, where the tax liability is determined based on
observable features of each business, rather than actual income. For this reason, in the
analyses performed below we will only consider the first group as self-employed. 12 The
remaining 10 percent of taxpayers are almost equally split into the “saver” and “investor”
categories, where the most relevant income sources are capital income or capital gains,
respectively.
The marginal tax rate (MTR) is not directly observed in the tax return data. Thus,
we use the available information on income and regional location, as well as the main
12To calculate all the statistics reported in Table 1, we apply the sampling weights contained in the
data.
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tax base parameters, to calculate the MTR with a self-constructed tax calculator in the
spirit of the NBER TAXSIM used in studies about the US. Building this tax calculator
is critical for our empirical strategy, as it is needed to calculate the predicted net-of-tax
In most of our regression analysis, we estimate the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the net-of-tax marginal rate. Therefore, we need a measure of the “overall”
marginal tax rate faced by each taxpayer. To do this, we construct a weighted marginal
tax rate on all taxable income, where the weights correspond to the relative importance
of each income source in each tax return.14 Let the share of income due to source j be
denoted by sjit ≡
(
zjit/zit
)
.15 Then the overall marginal tax rate for taxpayer i in year t
is given by:
τit =
∑
j
sjitτ
j
it.
Sample Selection and Homogeneous Definition of the Tax Base
We follow the existing literature to apply some sample restrictions to arrive at the es-
timation sample. First, we exclude taxpayers with negative taxable (or gross) income.
This is important because the main outcome variable is defined as the change in log
taxable income, which would not be properly defined if income in one of the periods is
negative. Since joint filing is only preferable for households in which the second earner
has very low income, we consider the tax declaration the unit of analysis. Moreover, we
13We describe the tax calculator in more detail in online Appendix B, and the full code is available
from the authors upon request. Table A.1 reports the percentage of observations in which taxable
income and tax liability calculated with our tax calculator is within two percent of the actual values
recorded in the administrative panel dataset of tax returns. The accuracy rates are always above 97.5
percent, and in many years they reach 100 percent.
14This approach was first implemented in the literature on the Spanish ETI by Onrubia and Sanz-Sanz
(2009), and a similar method is also used by Kleven and Schultz (2014) for Denmark.
15In less than two percent of observations, income is negative for at least one source (often business
income). To ensure that the weights in the formula add up to one for these observations, we apply a
normalization. We redefine the income shares for these observations as follows:
sˆjit ≡
max(0, sjit)∑
j max(0, s
j
it)
drop year-pair observations where taxpayers change their filing status between the base
year (t) and t + s. Further, we exclude pensioners, identified as taxpayers aged 65 and
rate instrumental variable used to identify causal effects.13 We calculate the marginal
tax rate separately for each income source, following Kleven and Schultz (2014). We first
calculate the tax liability for the observed taxable income, and then re-do the calculation
adding e10 to that amount. Then, we divide by 10 the difference between the two tax
liabilities, to obtain the marginal tax rate for each income source:
τ j =
T (zj + 10)− T (zj)
10
, where j = {L,KR,KF,B}
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above with positive labor income but zero social security contributions. The reason for
excluding pensioners is because their main source of income is determined mechanically
by public pension rules. Note that our main results are robust to including pensioners
in our estimation sample.
Contrary to common practice in the literature (e.g., Gruber and Saez, 2002, and
followers), we do not exclude observations below a certain threshold of gross income in the
base-year. Instead, we carefully document and quantify the existence of mean reversion in
each period. Then, in the regression analysis, we test different specifications of nonlinear
controls for base-year income to find an econometric solution to this potential bias. In
a robustness test, we check that our results are not affected by dropping taxpayers with
broad income below e5,000 or e10,000 in the base year (see Section 5 for details).
In line with the rest of the literature, our tax calculator contains a consistent defi-
nition of taxable income over time. This constant definition may not match the “legal”
definition of taxable income in every year, but this homogenization of the tax base is
needed for providing consistent estimates when tax reforms change the tax base (e.g., the
2007 reform). Without this adjustment, the dependent variable would change mechani-
cally every time the legal definition of the tax base changes, leading to biased estimates
(Kopczuk, 2005; Weber, 2014). When homogenizing the tax base over time, we follow the
earlier literature in excluding capital gains from the tax base, because its tax treatment
and economic nature is quite different from other income sources (see, for instance, the
discussion in Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012). We also consider the fact that financial
capital income is taxed under different tax bases over this period, as well as the fact that
the main component of personal and familiy deductions are converted into tax credits
since 2007.
Data availability allows us to compute for each year the gross and the adjusted
gross income for each source of income taxed in the PIT. We also have detailed yearly
information on the implementation rules and the amount of both the income-specific and
the general deductions that are substracted from each component of gross income and
from the aggregation of these components. In the particular case of homogenizing over
time the personal and famility tax credits created in 2007, we assume that the base of
these tax credits is equivalent to a deduction that reduces the general taxable income
as in the period 1999-2006. Taking together data availability and our homogenization
assumptions, we can create a homogenous definition of aggregate taxable income in the
Spanish PIT over the period 1999-2014.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the final sample used in the regression analyses,
covering the period 1999-2014. All monetary variables are in real 2012 euros. The sample
Summary Statistics
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restrictions described above plus the fact that we take 3-year differences of the data in
each period (which means we “lose” three years of observations), result in a baseline
panel dataset with 4.02 million observations.
Real average gross income in 2012 euros is e36,200, and real average taxable income
is e23,392, both with high dispersion and highly skewed to the right (i.e., the median is
lower than the average in both cases). The average net-of-tax rate is 0.71, corresponding
to a marginal tax rate of 29 percent. The average change in log real taxable income
is −0.02, although there is substantial heterogeneity in this variable, which can take
large values both positive and negative. The average change in the log net-of-tax rate
is also close to zero (−0.01), with substantial variation on both sides of its distribution.
Finally, the average taxpayer is 46.6 years old, 42 percent of taxpayers are female and
17 of households file jointly (in the latter case, the dataset records the gender and age
of the primary earner).
4 Estimation Strategy
We follow the previous literature and estimate a model in differences, using the predicted
change in the net of tax rate as an instrument for the actual change. To address the
identification challenges of mean reversion and heterogeneous income trends, we employ a
variety of nonlinear controls for base-year income as well as modifications of the baseline
instrument that have been poposed in the literature.
compared to a linear tax system with a tax rate equal to τ . Graphically, virtual income
can be depicted by extending the part of the budget set where the taxpayer is located
and finding its intersection with the vertical axis. Given this setup, we can write the
optimal choice of taxable income as z = z(1− τ, y).
Following Kleven and Schultz (2014), we write the following log-linear specification:
Consider the taxable income model used in the literature, which is an extension of the
traditional labor supply model. Taxpayers maximize a utility function u(c, z), where c is
consumption and z is reported taxable income. This function is increasing in consump-
tion and decreasing in taxable income, because generating income is costly. The budget
constraint is given by c = z−T (z), where T (·) represents tax liability, which is the result
of applying the tax schedule (a potentially nonlinear function) to a given taxable income.
Note that this budget constraint may also be written as c = (1−τ)z+y, where τ ≡ T ′(·)
is the marginal tax rate and y ≡ τz− T (z) is virtual income. The latter can be thought
of as the reduction in tax liability that results from the progressivity of the tax schedule,
4.1 Conceptual Framework
ln(zi,t) = α + ε ln(1− τi,t) + η ln(yi,t) + γctxci + γvxvi,t + μi + νi,t (1)
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where μi is an individual fixed effect that absorbs all time-invariant individual char-
acteristics. We include two sets of controls: xci includes time-invariant characteristics
whose effect may change over time (e.g., gender or joint vs. individual filing) and xvi,t
includes time-varying characteristics assumed to have a stable effect over time (e.g., age,
region). The term ε can be interpreted as the elasticity of taxable income with respect to
the net-of-tax-rate, while η is the elasticity with respect to virtual income. Notice that,
in this formulation, ε is the uncompensated elasticity, because the inclusion of virtual
income implies a linearization of the budget set around the optimal income choice.16
As is standard in the literature, we estimate a model in differences:
Δ ln(zi,t) = εΔ ln(1− τi,t) + Δη ln(yi,t) + Δγctxci + γvΔxvi,t + ui,t (2)
where Δ ln(zi,t) ≡ ln
(
zi,t+s
zi,t
)
, Δ ln(yi,t) ≡ ln
(
yi,t+s
yi,t
)
and Δ ln(1− τi,t) ≡ ln
(
1−τi,t+s
1−τi,t
)
.
After taking differences, the individual fixed effect μi drops out of the model. Notice that
in this specification, each observation consists of two tax returns from different years.
With this notation, the base year in each observation is denoted as year t.
4.2 Identification Strategy
Estimating equation (2) by ordinary least squares (OLS) would result in a biased estimate
of the ETI whenever the tax schedule is nonlinear (e.g., features progressivity), because
changes in taxable income can mechanically lead to changes in the net-of-tax rate. For
example, a positive income shock leads to an increase in the dependent variable and
it may also push the taxpayer to a higher marginal rate bracket, thereby reducing the
net-of-tax rate. This negative correlation between the dependent variable and the error
term creates an endogeneity problem, leading to a severe downward bias on the ETI
estimates obtained through OLS estimation of equation (2), as shown in panel (a) of
16See Kleven and Schultz (2014), p. 282, for a discussion.
Figure 4.
To deal with this endogeneity issue, we follow the instrumental variables strategy first
proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002), which has become standard in this literature. They
note that a change in the marginal tax rate can be due to a tax reform (mechanical effect)
or to taxpayers’ reoptimization (behavioral effect). The goal is to isolate the exogenous
variation created by tax reforms, netting out the behavioral response that may have also
affected the observed marginal rate. Specifically, Gruber and Saez (2002) compute the
marginal tax rate that taxpayers would have faced in period t+ s (where the convention
is to use s = 3) if their income had been the same (in real terms) as in the base year, t.
In practice, we calculate this predicted net-of-tax rate, τ p using the following expression:
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Δ ln
(
1− τ IVit
)
= ln
(
1− τ pi,t+s
1− τi,t
)
.
Then, the instrument is defined as the (log) change between the marginal tax rate
faced in t and the tax rate they would have faced in year t+ s keeping their real income
from year t. The first-stage relationship can be written as follows:
ln
(
1− τi,t+s
1− τi,t
)
= φ ln
(
1− τ pi,t+s
1− τi,t
)
+Δγctx
c
i + γ
vΔxvi,t + vi,t. (3)
Δln
(
yIVit
)
= ln (τ pitzit − T (zit)) .
The literature has extensively discussed two challenges to the empirical identification
of the ETI: mean reversion and heterogeneous income trends unrelated to tax changes
yit = τitzit − T (zit) .
Notice that, with a progressive tax schedule, virtual income is by definition non-negative.
To construct the instrument for the change in log virtual income, we use the predicted
marginal tax rate that we calculated to construct the net-of-tax rate instrument. Then,
the instrument is given by:17
tax liability. That is:
As we show below, this instrument yields a very strong first-stage relationship. There-
fore, we can safely conclude that the instrument is relevant. However, it is not guaranteed
that the exclusion restriction holds if base-year income is a good predictor of future in-
come change, potentially making the instrument invalid. For example, the influential
paper by Weber (2014) argues that the instrument may violate the exclusion restriction
when taxable income features substantial serial correlation because shocks to zt are cor-
related with shocks to zt+s. We explore the implications of this issue in the following
subsection.
In the regressions following the estimation method of Kleven and Schultz (2014), we
include virtual income in the regressions to account for income effects. The theoretical
definition states that virtual income is equal to the tax liability that would apply to a
taxpayer if all her taxable income was taxed at the marginal tax rate, minus her actual
17For expositional simplicity, we omit the first-stage equation for the change in virtual income, which
is similar to equation (3) above.
τ pi,t ≡
Tt+s (zi,t + 10)− Tt+s (zi,t)
10
,
where the subscript in Tt+s indicates that we calculate the tax liability using the tax
schedule of period t+ s. We can then easily construct the instrument for the change in
the log net-of-tax rate as follows:
4.2.1 Mean Reversion and Heterogeneous Income Trends
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(Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012). We discuss them in detail here, and describe some
potential solutions that have been proposed.
Mean reversion arises because taxpayers with a positive (negative) income shock in
year t tend to have, on average, lower (higher) income in year t+s (s = 1, 2, 3...) as they
return to their permanent income. In our specific context, Figure 2 plots the change
in log taxable income between period t and period t + s by bins of base-year taxable
income, for periods 1999-2006 (left) and 2007-2014 (right). Mean reversion is clearly
visible in these graphs: the change in log taxable income is very high for taxpayers with
low base-year taxable income and substantially lower than average for those with high
base-year taxable income. Notice also that there is no evidence of mean reversion in the
middle of the income distribution, i.e. between e10,000 and e50,000, suggesting that
the problem is constrained for extreme income observations. Using a log scale in the
horizontal axis makes these figures consistent with the log-log specification of equation
(2).
In both periods, mean reversion is concentrated at the top and, most dramatically, at
the bottom of the distribution. The pattern is significantly more pronounced in the 2007-
2014 for two reasons. First, the definition of taxable income is different, as explained in
section 3.1: from 2007 onwards, the personal exemption is not deducted from taxable
income, but rather treated as a tax credit which is subtracted from “gross” tax liability.
Thus, taxpayers with low gross income (below the personal exemption) are included in
the calculations for 2007-2014 as they have positive taxable income, but they are not
included in 1999-2006. Second, the behavioral responses at the top of the distribution
have different effects for tax cuts vs. tax increases. In the 2003 reform, the top marginal
income was reduced, so we expect high earners to increase their taxable income, partly
cancelling out the mean reversion pattern. Instead, after the 2012 tax increase we expect
high earners to decrease their taxable income, thereby exacerbating the mean reversion
pattern in this figure. To sum up, the main implication from the evidence shown in
Figure 2 is that although the mean reversion problem is more relevant for the period
2007-2014 than for 1999-2006, mean reversion should be considered when estimating the
ETI for the full period 1999-2014.
Heterogeneous income trends across groups of taxpayers that are differently affected
by tax reforms are problematic for the estimation of the ETI, as they may be a confounder
when trying to identify the response to tax changes. In the case of the US, the sustained
increase in income inequality in the 1980s complicates the analysis of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act. This reform implied a large drop in the top marginal tax rate, so the
(relatively) high income growth rate for top earners could be due to both the response
to the tax reform and the general increase in income inequality due to secular trends
in income of top earners. The US literature has devoted a lot of attention to this issue
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(see Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012, for a summary). However, in countries where the
income distribution has been more stable this issue would be less relevant. In Figure 3,
we show the evolution of top income shares in Spain throughout the period 1999-2014,
using the same panel dataset as in our regression analysis. Specifically, we plot the total
gross income earned by taxpayers in the top 0.1, 1 and 5 percent, where each category
includes the smaller ones. There are no significant changes in top shares in this period,
suggesting that secular income trends are not a first-order issue when estimating the
ETI for Spain.18 However, the Great Recession could have created heterogeneous income
trends across goups of taxpayers in the middle of the income distribution suggesting the
need to consider them in the empirical strategy.
To address the potential bias from mean reversion and heterogeneous income trends,
multiple studies have proposed ways to control for log base-year income. For example,
beginning with Auten and Carroll (1999), many papers in this literature include log
base-year taxable income in a specification similar to (2), while Gruber and Saez (2002)
include cubic splines of that variable to allow more flexibility. Weber (2014) addresses
18Kleven and Schultz (2014) reach a similar conclusion for Denmark.
5 Results
We first present our main estimates of the elasticity of taxable income for the period
1999-2014, using the longest panel dataset available in a consistent format. We present
results for the three alternative estimation methods described in the previous section:
Gruber and Saez (2002), Kleven and Schultz (2014) and Weber (2014). Second we ana-
lyze the heterogeneity of the elasticity by type of taxpayer and by source of income. We
then study the anatomy of the response to tax reforms by estimating the elasticity of
broad income (EBI) and the responsivenes of several tax deductions, to assess what part
of the ETI is due to real, avoidance and evasion responses. In the last subsection, we
conduct two additional robustness exercises: first, we exclude taxpayers below a given
threshold of base-year taxable income (e5,000 and e10,000), a strategy often used in
the empirical challenges to estimate the ETI using two differentiated strategies. She
proposed dealing with mean reversion by constructing the predicted-tax-rate instrument
using further lags of taxable income. Regarding heterogeneous trends in income, she uses
splines of log taxable income in periods prior to the base year, following her argument that
nonlinear functions of log base-year taxable income may be endogenous. Finally, Kleven
and Schultz (2014) apply a refinement of the Gruber- Saez estimation strategy, adding
an instrument for virtual income to separately estimate income effects. We report results
from multiple variants of these state-of-the-art methodological approaches to estimate
the ETI in the next section.
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the existing literature to mitigate mean reversion at the bottom of the distribution. Sec-
ond, we obtain elasticity estimates with alternative time differences, i.e. one-year and
two-year differences instead of the standard three-year difference. Finally, we discuss
several sensitivity analysis of the baseline estimates: (i) including lagged splines in each
estimation method; (ii) estimating the ETI on a balanced panel of taxpayers; (iii) includ-
ing pensioners in the estimation sample; and (iv) excluding taxpayers who move across
regions.
5.1 Main Elasticity Estimates
The first three columns in Table 3 report the OLS, first-stage, reduced-form estimates
for the period 1999-2014 to show how the estimation strategy affects the elasticity esti-
mates. Columns 4-6 show the two-stage least squares (2SLS) for different specifications
using the predicted-tax-rate instrument proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002). All spec-
ifications include year and region fixed effects to control for common shocks. To proxy
for taxpayers’ permanent income, we also include age, age squared and indicators for
gender, joint filing, the presence of children or old-age dependents in the household, and
the main source of income (note that we include this set of controls in all specifications
reported below, unless otherwise noted). Column 1 reports the results from OLS esti-
mation of (2). The coefficient on Δ ln(1− τ) is negative, large (−4.230) and statistically
significant at the one percent level. This is consistent with substantial downward bias,
as predicted by theory. Column 2 reports the first-stage regression of Δ ln(1− τ) on the
instrument, Δ ln(1 − τ p). The point estimate on the latter is 0.633, and the F-statistic
is in the hundreds of thousands, well above the standard thresholds required to certify
instrument relevance. Column 3 reports the reduced-form regression of the change in log
income, Δ ln(z) on the instrument, Δ ln(1− τ p), which yields a point estimate of 0.204,
again highly significant. These regression results are consistent with the graphical evi-
dence provided in Figure 4, which shows a strongly downward-sloping OLS relationship
(panel a), a strongly upward-sloping first-stage relationship (panel b), and a moderately
upward-sloping reduced-form relationship (panel c). In the latter panel, we show the
reduced-form relationship constructing the predicted change in the log of the net-of-tax
rate lagged one and two years.
Column 4 reports the second-stage results using the Gruber and Saez (2002) IV
strategy, without any controls for base-year income. The estimated taxable income
elasticity is 0.322, with a standard error of 0.015. As discussed above, this estimate
could be biased because of the lack of controls for mean reversion or heterogeneous
income trends. Column 5 reports the main specification in Gruber and Saez (2002), which
includes a five-piece cubic spline of log base-year income to correct for mean reversion.
The estimated elasticity of taxable income is 0.356. Column 6, includes a five-piece
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linear spline of log taxable-income, yielding a point estimate of 0.343. All estimates are
highly statistically significant, thanks to the large sample size of more than four million
observations. One caveat to the interpretation of these results is that the p-value for
the diff-in-Sargan test statistic, used to determine whether the instrument is exogenous,
is close to zero in all three specifications. This implies rejecting the null hypothesis of
exogenous instruments, in line with the results from Weber (2014). Therefore, the ETI
estimates in columns 4-6 should be interpreted with caution.
Table 4 reports ETI estimates for the same period (1999-2014) using the two alter-
native estimation methods described in Section 4. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates for
the model proposed by Kleven and Schultz (2014), which includes the (instrumented)
change in log virtual income to capture income effects separately from substitution ef-
fects. The point estimates for the (compensated) ETI are 0.543 and 0.538 in columns
1 and 2, which include cubic and log splines of base-year income, respectively. The co-
efficients on the change in log virtual income are close to zero, suggesting that income
effects are of second-order importance in this context (consistent with the earlier liter-
ature, e.g. Gruber and Saez, 2002; Kleven and Schultz, 2014). Columns 3 through 6
present results from the model proposed by Weber (2014), who constructs the predicted
tax rate instrument using further lags of taxable income. In columns 3 and 4, we include
cubic and log splines, respectively, of log base-year taxable income. We obtain ETI esti-
mates above 0.80, substantially larger than the previous results. In columns 5 and 6, we
implement the main specification proposed by Weber (2014), including lagged versions
of the base-year income splines to additionally control for heterogenous income trends.
This yields ETI estimates of 0.644 and 0.628. It is important to note that the Weber
estimator is the only one that passes the diff-in-Sargan test of instrument exogeneity
consistently, while we can reject the exogeneity of the Gruber-Saez and Kleven-Schultz
instruments in these specifications.
Taken together, the results from Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the ETI estimates for
Spain in the period 1999-2014 using the three most popular methods available are be-
tween 0.35 and 0.64, with the lowest estimate obtained using the Gruber-Saez estimator
and highest with the Weber estimator. The fact that all estimates are broadly of the
same order of magnitude suggests that the availability of a long panel dataset over a
period with multiple tax reforms (combining tax cuts and increases) affecting different
parts of the income distribution contributes to finding stable estimates of the ETI, which
has been a challenge in this literature (see Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012).
5.2 Anatomy of the Response
In this subsection, we explore the anatomy of the aggregate taxable income responses
documented above. Table 5 reports estimates of the ETI for employees (columns 1-4) vs.
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self-employed taxpayers (columns 5-8). In each case, we present two specifications using
the Gruber-Saez method (with cubic and log splines), one using Kleven-Schultz’s method
(with cubic splines) and one using Weber’s method (with lagged cubic splines). The ETI
estimate for employees is between 0.23 and 0.47. In contrast, the ETI for self-employed
taxpayers is 0.65 with the Gruber-Saez method, 0.93 with Kleven-Schultz’s and above
1.45 with Weber’s. The results clearly indicate that self-employed taxpayers are much
more responsive to changes in marginal tax rates than wage employees. This follows
economic intuition, as self-employed workers have more flexibility to adjust their taxable
income for two reasons: (i) they can easily change their labor supply because they’re
not limited to a fixed-hours contract, and (ii) they have more scope to avoid or evade
taxes, because a large share of their income is not third-party reported. The results are
also consistent with a large body of evidence documenting larger responses to taxation
by self-employed workers compared to employees (see, for example, Chetty et al., 2011;
Kleven et al., 2011).
In Table 6, we focus on the elasticity of different types of income to the same tax
reforms, as done by Kleven and Schultz (2014) in their study of Danish tax reforms.
We find that labor income and financial capital income (shown in Panels A and B) are
the least responsive to tax changes, with ETIs between 0.18 and 0.38 in the first case
and between 0.24 and 0.32 in the second (with Gruber-Saez always yielding the lowest
and Weber the largest point estimates). Real estate capital income (Panel C) is slightly
more responsive, with an ETI between 0.35 and 0.49. Business income (shown in Panel
D), in contrast, is highly responsive and features an ETI between 0.80 and 1.42. Notice
that the sample size is different in each of these sets of regressions, because the outcome
variables are defined as log changes, so any observations with zero (or negative) income
automatically drop out.
We then turn to studying whether taxpayers’ responses are due to real labor supply
changes, tax avoidance or tax evasion. To do this, Table 7 reports estimates of the
elasticity of broad income (EBI), defined as the sum of all income sources subtracting
only income-related deductions (e.g., social security contributions paid by employees).19
The EBI provides a measure of the real (e.g., labor supply) and evasion (e.g., income
underreporting) responses to taxation, whereas the ETI also accounts for avoidance
reponses (e.g., taking advantage of more tax deductions). As in previous tables, we
report results for three different estimation methods: Gruber-Saez (columns 1-2), Kleven-
Schultz (columns 3-4) and Weber (columns 5-6). The estimates of the EBI are between
0.10 and 0.24 in all specifications, suggesting that real and evasion responses account for
about one-third of the total taxable income response to taxation. However, the relevance
of reporting responses is heterogeneous across types of taxpayers. Indeed, Table 8 further
19We do exclude from the definition of broad income all types of capital gains, for the reasons discussed
in Section 3.3.
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explores whether wage employees and self-employed taxpayers have a different EBI.
Indeed, wage employees have a very low EBI (below 0.10 across all specifications), while
self-employed have an EBI around 1. These results confirm the intuition that reported
income of the self-employed is much more responsive to taxation either through a real
We conduct a number of additional empirical exercises to check the robustness of our
results. In Table 10, we report estimates of the ETI restricting the sample to taxpayers
with base-year broad income above e5,000 (Panel A) and e10,000 (Panel B), respec-
tively. This is an often-used restriction in the literature, where it is justified as a way to
deal with intense mean reversion at the bottom of the income distribution (Gruber and
Saez, 2002). Comparing the results in Table 10 to those in columns 5-6 in Table 3 and
columns 1-2 and 5-6 in Table 4, we find that the ETI estimates are very similar. These
20The maximum deductible annual contribution amount was e24,250 between 2003 and 2007, then
lowered to e12,500 in 2007 (e10,000 for taxpayers under 50 years).
or an evasion response.
In Table 9, we shift the focus to examine the responses of reported tax deductions
to changes in marginal tax rates. We follow the approach of Doerrenberg, Peichl and
Siegloch (2017) and use the same identification strategy as in previous tables, but with
the log change in tax deductions as the dependent variable. In these specifications, we
expect to find negative point estimates because the outcome variable is the log change in
deductions, which are subtracted from taxable income: if the net-of-tax rate decreases
(tax increase), taxpayers will tend to claim higher deductions to lower their tax liabil-
ity. Panel A of Table 9 reports estimates of the elasticity of log total deductions with
respect to the net-of-tax rate. The estimates across different models range from −0.18
to −0.45 and are all highly siginificant, indicating that there is some responsivenes of
deductions. Panel B shows that the estimated elasticity increases (in absolute value) to
a range between −0.26 and −0.77 when we exclude the personal deduction, as expected
because this deduction depends on taxpayer characteristics such as age and number of
dependents, which are hard to modify in the short term. Finally, Panel C focuses on
the deduction for private pension contributions, which is interesting for two reasons: it
is the most relevant deduction in terms of foregone tax revenue and taxpayers can freely
choose the annual amount they contribute to private pension plans, up to an annual
maximum. 20 Taxpayers are very responsive to this particular deduction, with elasticity
estimates between −0.70 and up to −1.52 depending on the specification. Overall, the
results from this table indicate that an important part of the response to tax changes
is due to responses along the reported deductions margin, in particular the deduction
for private pension contributions. Hence, we conclude that an important driver of the
taxable income responses in Spain over the period 1999-2014 was (legal) tax avoidance.
5.3 Robustness Checks
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results are reassuring because they indicate that, despite the massive mean reversion
at the bottom of the distribution documented in Figure 2, the inclusion of non-linear
controls for base-year income (cubic and log splines) is enough to make the estimates
stable for all three estimation methods.
In Table 11, we present results using two-year and one-year differences to assess how
our main estimates change under different time horizons. Up until this point, we have
followed the ETI literature’s convention of analyzing three-year differences. The rationale
for this is to avoid capturing mostly anticipation responses (in the form of re-timing of
reported income or deductions across years) instead of the medium-term response to
tax changes. The top panel of Table 11 shows the results with two-year differences and
the bottom panel with one-year differences. The results for the Gruber-Saez method
(columns 1-2) and Weber’s method (columns 5-6) are similar to the baseline estimates
from Tables 3 and 4. In contrast, the estimates using the Kleven-Schultz method are
lower, between 0.14 and 0.17, although still statistically different from zero.
In the online Appendix, we report additional robustness checks, showing: estimates
of the Gruber-Saez and Kleven-Schultz methods with lagged base-year income splines
(Table A.2), ETI estimates from a balanced panel of taxpayers present in the sample
for all years between 1999 and 2014 (Table A.3), ETI estimates including pensioners
(Table A.4) and, finally, ETI estimates excluding taxpayers who moved across regions
within Spain during the period under analysis (Table A.5). In all four cases, we report
the results for the three estimation methods with cubic and log splines (lagged in the
Weber specifications). We generally obtain ETI estimates very similar to those obtained
in Tables 3 and 4, providing further support to the robustness of our results.
As a final exercise we examine the distribution of taxable income around kinkpoints
of the income tax schedule to obtain alternative estimates of the ETI using bunching
methods (Saez, 2010). We find very almost no bunching evidence in any period, con-
sistent with an existing working paper by Esteller-Moré and Foremny (2016). All the
histograms with the distribution of taxable income around kinks are shown in online
Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2. Note that the lack of bunching evidence does not neces-
sarily imply that our panel-based estimates are biased, as there are well-known reasons
for the bunching estimator to be biased towards zero, such as optimization frictions,
inattention and career concerns (for a detailed discussion, see Kleven, 2016).
5.4 Discussion of Results
We conclude from these results that Spanish taxpayers’ response to tax changes are
moderate, with significant heterogeneity in the response across groups of taxpayers and
types of income. Given the well-known limitations of the Gruber-Saez estimator (po-
tential endogeneity, weak controls for heterogeneous income trends and exclusion of
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income effects), and the results of the diff-in-Sargan test of instrument exogeneity, we
consider that the most reliable estimates are those obtained using the Kleven-Schultz
and, especially, Weber methods. In Table 4, we obtain point estimates between 0.52-
0.54 (Kleven-Schultz method) and 0.62-0.64 (Weber method). In the robustness tests of
Tables 10 and A.2-A.5 the ETI estimates using these two methods (with cubic or log
splines) are all between 0.45 and 0.64. Therefore, we conclude that the most reliable
ETI estimates for Spain for the period 1999-2014 are in the range between 0.45 and 0.64.
These estimates of the ETI are on the upper part of the range of “consensus” estimates
for the US (except for a few studies such as Feldstein, 1995; Mertens and Olea, 2018).
They are similar in magnitude to the ETI estimates for Germany (Doerrenberg, Peichl
and Siegloch, 2017), and substantially higher than the estimates for Denmark (Kleven
and Schultz, 2014).
Regarding the anatomy of the response, we highlight two important results. First,
the larger ETI estimates for self-employed taxpayers and business income confirms the
intuition that responses to taxation depend both on tax enforcement intensity and the
availability of reaction margins (e.g., fixed-hours contracts vs. independent work). Sec-
ond, the high elasticity of tax deductions indicates the relevance of avoidance responses
to taxation. They also contribute to rationalizing the small estimated EBI compared to
the higher ETI estimates. Nevertheless, the significant EBI estimates for self-employed
taxpayers suggests that reporting responses (possibly due to real and evasion responses)
are relevant for that group.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have estimated the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) using a panel of
administrative tax returns from the Spanish personal income tax for the period 1999-
2014. The identification strategy mainly exploits three major reforms introduced at
different stages of the business cycle that had different effects on the tax schedule: a tax
cut in 2003, an overhaul of the tax in 2007 and a tax increase in 2012. This identifying
variation is complemented with other legislative tax changes that mainly affected average
tax rates, allowing the possibility to identify and estimate the existence of income effects.
We find elasticities of taxable income (ETI) for the entire 1999-2014 period in line
with the most recent evidence for advanced economies, between 0.45 and 0.64, implying
moderate medium-term responses of taxpayers to changes in personal income tax rates.
However, we document significant heterogeneity in the response to tax changes across
groups of taxpayers and for different sources of income. In particular, estimates of the
ETI for self-employed taxpayers are on average three times larger than the estimates for
wage employees. Consistent with that, business and real-estate capital income exhibit
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stronger responses to taxation than labor income, which is subject to both stricter tax
enforcement and market rigidities. In terms of the anatomy of the response, we find
smaller elasticities of the broad income, in the range between 0.10 and 0.24, although they
are quantitatively relevant, particularly for self-employed taxpayers. The differences in
magnitude between the estimated ETI and EBI indicates the relevance of tax deductions
in taxpayers’ responses. Indeed, we document an elasticity exceeding one for some tax
deductions, such as the one for private pension plan contributions.
As stressed by the long-standing literature on the ETI, this elasticity is not a struc-
tural parameter and its identification is subject to multiple econometric challenges, which
often result in unstable estimates. Considering these limitations, this paper presents a
broad set of sensitivity analyses in order to test the robustness of our estimates. Adapt-
ing recent methodological approaches, we show that our estimates are robust to potential
biases created by mean reversion and heterogeneous income trends across groups of tax-
payers unrelated to tax reforms.
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Figures
Figure 1: Tax Reforms
(a) 2003 Reform
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(b) 2012 Tax Increase
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Notes: the top panels depict the income tax schedule on the general tax base before and after the
2003 reform, which reduced the marginal tax rate (MTR) at the bottom and top of the taxable income
distribution (top-left panel), leaving the middle brackets almost unaffected and resulting in a reduction
of the average tax rate (ATR) for all income levels (top-right panel). The bottom panels depict the tax
schedule on the general tax base before and after the 2012 reform, which increased the marginal and
average tax rates for all income levels, with a larger increase for higher incomes. We use a log scale for
base-year in the horizontal axis for comparability with Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Mean Reversion Problem
(a) Period 1999-2006
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(b) Period 2007-2014
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Notes: each dot represents the average change in log taxable income for bins of base-year taxable income
(in real euros, using a log scale). Observations are grouped into 100 intervals of the horizontal axis with
a similar number of observations. Thus, more spaced points indicate that there are fewer taxpayers
in a given income range. Panel (a) refers to the 1999-2006 period and panel (b) refers to the 2007-
2014 period. Both figures show the existence of mean-reversion in the low and the top tails of the
income distribution. Mean reversion is particularly relevant for the second-period of analysis (panel b),
especially at the bottom of the distribution but also at the top.
Figure 3: Top Income Shares, 1999-2014
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Notes: this figure shows the evolution of top income shares annually for the period 1999-2014. For each
year, we calculate the total amount of gross income earned by taxpayers in the top 0.1, 1 and 5 percent
of the distribution, and then compute their share out of total gross income reported by all taxpayers.
The data is from tax returns included in the administrative panel dataset compiled by the Instituto de
Estudios Fiscales (see Section 3.3 for details). To compute the income shares, we elevate each observation
included in the sample by the sampling weight reported in the data, which represents the inverse of
the probability of being selected. Gross income is defined as the sum of all income components (labor,
financial capital income, real-estate capital income, business income and other imputed income) taxed
in the Spanish personal income tax, excluding capital gains due to their transitory nature.
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Figure 4: Graphical Analysis (1999-2014)
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(b) First-Stage Relationship
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(c) Reduced-Form Relationship with Various Definitions of the Instrument
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Notes: each dot in these figures represents the average of the vertical axis variable over bins of the
horizontal axis variable, where the each bin contains a similar number of observations. Panel (a)
represents the OLS relationship between the outcome variable of interest Δ ln(z) and the endogenous
covariate Δ ln(1− τ). Panel (b) represents the first-stage relationship between the endogenous covariate
Δ ln(1− τ) and the predicted tax rate instrument Δ ln(1− τp). Panel (c) represents the reduced-form
relationship between the outcome variable Δ ln(z) and the instrument Δ ln(1 − τp), where the latter
has been computed using one, two and three lags of taxable income. The regression lines depicted are
estimated using the same number of observations as in the regressions in columns 1-3 of Table 3, without
including any controls or fixed effects.
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Notes: this table reports the share of broad income due to each income source (left panel) and the share
of income received by each category of taxpayer (right panel). The definition of the categories is given
in Section 3.3. All results based on data for the period 1999-2014 from the administrative panel dataset
of income tax returns provided by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (Pérez, Villanueva and Molinero,
2018) and applying the sampling weights contained in the dataset.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Percentiles
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min p10 p50 p90 Max Obs.
Broad Income, y 36,200.05 64,302.55 13.20 14,853.51 28,684.88 60,643.26 >10m 4,021,572
in real 2012 euros
Taxable Income, z 23,392.43 56,868.92 1.01 3,991.63 16,539.9 45,407.44 >10m 4,021,572
in real 2012 euros
Change in log taxable -0.02 0.85 -11.63 -0.80 0.02 0.67 11.08 4,021,572
income, Δ ln(z)
Change in log net-of-tax -0.01 0.07 -0.82 -0.11 0.00 0.06 0.66 4,021,572
rate, Δ ln(1− τ)
Age in years 46.61 11.34 18 32 46 62 >100 4,021,572
Net-of-tax Rate, (1− τ) 0.71 0.07 0.43 0.61 0.72 0.76 1.00 4,021,572
Female (dummy) 0.42 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 4,021,572
Joint filing (dummy) 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 1 1 4,021,572
Notes: this table reports summary statistics for observations included in the panel dataset covering the
period 1999-2014, used in the main regression analysis, e.g. Table 3. Monetary values are reported
in real 2012 euros. Averages are calculated taking into account the sampling weights assigned to each
observation. The total number of observations reported is unweighted. See discussion in sections 3.3 and
5 for details on the sample restrictions imposed by both data analysis and the methodological approach.
Tables
Table 1: Distribution of Income by Source and Taxpayer Types
Share of Share of
Income Source Income Taxpayer Category Declarations
Labor income 79.0% Employee 82.0%
Business income 8.3% Self-employed 7.8%
Direct estimation 5.5% Direct estimation 5.2%
Objective est. & Agric. 2.8% Objective est. & Agric. 2.6%
Capital income 8.9% Saver 4.8%
Capital gains 3.9% Investor 5.0%
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Table 3: Elasticity of Taxable Income: Baseline Estimates
OLS 1stStage RedForm Gruber-Saez
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln(1− τ) -4.230*** 0.322*** 0.356*** 0.343***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Δ ln (1− τ p) 0.633*** 0.204***
(0.001) (0.009)
Observations 4,012,332 4,012,332 4,014,214 4,012,332 4,012,332 4,012,332
Diff-in-Sargan p-value - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Base-Year Splines none none none none Cubic Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat on IV 336,178
Notes: this table reports regression results for the panel dataset for the period 1999-2014. Column 1
reports the OLS estimates of the regression Δ ln(zit) = εΔ ln(1 − τ) + γxi,t + ui,t. Column 2 reports
the first-stage regression, i.e. Δ ln(1 − τ) = φΔ ln(1 − τp) + γxi,t + vi,t, using the predicted tax rate
instrument standard in the ETI literature, as in Gruber and Saez (2002). The F-statistic corresponds
to testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the instrument is equal to zero. Column 3 reports
the reduced-form estimator, i.e. Δ ln(zit) = θΔ ln 1− τp+wi,t. Columns 4 through 6 report the second-
stage of the 2SLS estimator using three-year differences, again following the standard specification in
the literature. Column 4 does not include any controls for base-year income. Column 5 includes a
five-piece cubic spline of log base-year income. Column 6 includes a five-piece spline of log base-year
income. Standard errors clustered by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications include
regional and year fixed-effects as well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint
filing, children, ascendants and the type of taxpayer according to her main source of income (employee,
self-employed, saver or taxpayers with other main source of income such as capital gains). Observations
in all regressions are weighted by log base-year taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%,
and * = 10%.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1924
Table 4: Elasticity of Taxable Income: Alternative Estimators
Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.543*** 0.538*** 0.847*** 0.816*** 0.644*** 0.628***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Δ ln(v) 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 3,538,825 3,538,5825 3,032,125 3,032,125 2,983,196 2,983,196
Diff-in-Sargan p-value 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.89 0.23 0.20
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports regression results for the panel dataset for the period 1999-2014, using alterna-
tive estimation methods. Columns 1 and 2 report the 2SLS estimates applying the method proposed by
Kleven and Schultz (2014), which uses the same instrument as Gruber and Saez (2002), but also includes
the change in log virtual income, Δ ln(v), to capture income effects. Column 1 includes a cubic spline of
log base-year income, whereas column 2 includes a spline of log base-year income. Columns 3-6 report
the results of applying the estimation method proposed by Weber (2014), where the instrument is based
on further lags of taxable income. Columns 3 and 4 include a cubic and log spline of base-year income,
respectively, while columns 5 and 6 include lagged versions of those splines. Standard errors clustered
by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year fixed-effects as well
as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children, ascendants and the type
of taxpayer according to her main source of income (employee, self-employed, saver or taxpayers with
other main source of income such as capital gains). Observations in all regressions are weighted by log
base-year taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
Table 5: Heterogeneity: Employees vs Self-employed
Employees Self-Employed
Gruber-Saez K-Schultz Weber Gruber-Saez K-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.245*** 0.232*** 0.472*** 0.349*** 0.657*** 0.692*** 0.932*** 1.452***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.037) (0.046) (0.046) (0.053) (0.096)
Δ ln(v) 0.040*** 0.052***
(0.001) (0.003)
Observations 3,435,507 3,435,507 3,068,501 2,573,719 411,207 411,207 339,946 289,264
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Lag Cubic Cubic Log Cubic Lag Cubic
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports elasticity estimates for two groups of taxpayers: employees (columns 1-4) and
self-employed workers (columns 5-8), defined based on the main source of income, as explained in Section
3.3. All regressions include data for the period 1999-2014. Columns 1 and 2 report the ETI estimates
for employees using the Gruber and Saez (2002) method, with cubic and log splines of base-year income.
Column 3 reports the estimates using the method from Kleven and Schultz (2014) with a cubic spline,
and column 4 reports the estimates using the method from Weber (2014), with a lagged cubic spline.
Standard errors clustered by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional
and year fixed-effects as well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing,
children and ascendants. Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year taxable income.
Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity: ETI by Income Source
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Labor Income
Δ ln(1− τL) 0.180*** 0.187*** 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.383*** 0.363***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.041) (0.041)
Observations 1,956,384 1,956,384 1,886,879 1,886,879 1,909,497 1,909,497
Panel B: Financial Capital Income
Δ ln(1− τKf ) 0.249*** 0.251*** 0.242*** 0.246*** 0.318*** 0.307***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.056) (0.055)
Observations 1,606,740 1,606,740 1,517,351 1,517,351 1,568,973 1,568,973
Panel C: Real Estate Capital Income
Δ ln(1− τKr) 0.377*** 0.360*** 0.358*** 0.344*** 0.489*** 0.457***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.072) (0.072)
Observations 971,329 971,329 910,729 910,729 949,038 949,038
Panel D: Business Income
Δ ln(1− τB) 0.889*** 0.889*** 0.800*** 0.802*** 1.402*** 1.422***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.062) (0.062) (0.109) (0.109)
Observations 438,461 438,461 404,822 404,822 427,845 427,845
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports elasticity estimates for four sources of income: labor income (Panel A), financial
capital income (Panel B), real estate capital income (Panel C) and business income (Panel D), as
explained in Section 3.3. All regressions include data for the period 1999-2014. Columns 1 and 2 report
the ETI estimates for employees using the Gruber and Saez (2002) method, with cubic and log splines
of base-year income. Column 3 reports the estimates using the method from Kleven and Schultz (2014)
with a cubic spline, and column 4 reports the estimates using the method from Weber (2014), with a
lagged cubic spline. Standard errors clustered by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications
include regional and year fixed-effects as well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators
for joint filing, children and ascendants. Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year
taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 7: Elasticity of Broad Income (EBI)
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.238*** 0.233***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025)
Δ ln(v) 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3,439,943 3,439,943 3,133,419 3,133,419 2,983,015 2,983,015
Base-Year Splines Lag Cubic Lag Log Lag Cubic Lag Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports the elasticity of broad income (EBI), defined as the sum of income from all
sources, without subtracting deductions but excluding capital gains for the reasons stated in Section
3.3. All regressions include data for the period 1999-2014. Columns 1-2 report the estimates of the
EBI applying the Gruber-Saez estimation method under two alternatives: lagged cubic splines (column
1) and lagged log splines (column 2). Columns 3-4 report the estimates of the EBI using the method
from Kleven and Schultz (2014) under two alternatives: lagged cubic splines (column 3) and lagged log
splines (column 4). Columns 5-6 report the estimates of the EBI using the method from Weber (2014)
under two alternatives: lagged cubic splines (column 5) and lagged log splines (column 6). Standard
errors clustered by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year
fixed-effects as well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children,
ascendants and the type of taxpayer according to her main source of income (employee, self-employed,
saver or taxpayers with other main source of income such as capital gains). Observations in all regressions
are weighted by log base-year taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of EBI Estimates: Employees vs Self-employed
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Employees
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.080*** 0.072***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026)
Δ ln(v) 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,963,230 2,963,230 2,724,917 2,724,917 2,573,610 2,573,610
Panel B: Self-Employed
Δ ln(1− τ) 1.108*** 0.904*** 0.770*** 0.779*** 1.153*** 1.181***
(0.029) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.066) (0.067)
Δ ln(v) 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 434,610 434,610 372,146 372,146 372,412 372,412
Base-Year Splines Lag Cubic Lag Log Lag Cubic Lag Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports the elasticity of broad income (EBI) for two groups of taxpayers: employees
(Panel A) and self-employed workers (Panel B), defined based on the main source of income, as explained
in Section 3.3. All regressions include data for the period 1999-2014. In each Panel, columns 1-2 report
the estimates of the EBI applying the Gruber-Saez estimation method under two alternatives: lagged
cubic splines (column 1) and lagged log splines (column 2). Columns 3-4 report the estimates of the
EBI using the method from Kleven and Schultz (2014) under two alternatives: lagged cubic splines
(column 3) and lagged log splines (column 4). Columns 5-6 report the estimates of the ETI using
the method from Weber (2014) under two alternatives: lagged cubic splines (column 5) and lagged log
splines (column 6). Standard errors clustered by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications
include regional and year fixed-effects as well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators
for joint filing, children and ascendants. Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year
taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 9: Elasticity of Tax Deductions
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Total Deductions
Δ ln(1− τ) -0.189*** -0.183*** -0.382*** -0.377*** -0.452*** -0.450***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 4,010,925 4,010,925 3,537,912 3,537,912 2,982,260 2,982,260
Panel B: Total Deductions except Personal & Family Deduction
Δ ln(1− τ) -0.275*** -0.263*** -0.559*** -0.550*** -0.771*** -0.760***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.035) (0.034
Observations 3,609,976 3,609,976 3,228,893 3,228,893 2,716,926 2,716,926
Panel C: Deduction for Private Pension Contributions
Δ ln(1− τ) -0.703*** -0.692*** -0.967*** -0.959*** -1.519*** -1.492***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.037) (0.065) (0.064)
Observations 1,323,968 1,323,968 1,171,693 1,171,693 1,059,150 1,059,150
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports the elasticity of tax deductions for the period 1999-2014. In panel A, the
dependent variable is the change in log of all deductions. In panel B, the dependent variable is the
change in log deductions, excluding the deduction for personal and family circumstances. In panel C,
the dependent variable is the change in the log of deductions for contributions to private pension plans.
In each panel, we report the elasticity of deductions under different estimation models: Gruber-Saez
in columns 1-3, Kleven-Schultz in columns 4-5 and Weber in columns 6-7. Standard errors clustered
by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year fixed-effects as
well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children and ascendants.
Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year taxable income. Significance levels: *** =
1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 10: Robustness to Base-year Income Thresholds
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Base-year Broad Income yi,t−3 > e5,000
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.362*** 0.350*** 0.551*** 0.545*** 0.644*** 0.628***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.036)
Δ ln(v) 0.042*** 0.043***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 4,009,988 4,009,988 3,537,959 3,537,959 2,982,049 2,982,049
Panel B: Base-year Broad Income yi,t−3 > e10,000
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.383*** 0.376*** 0.575*** 0.571*** 0.599*** 0.589***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.036) (0.036)
Δ ln(v) 0.041*** 0.037***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 3,947,751 3,947,751 3,497,541 3,497,541 2,946,560 2,946,560
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports the elasticity of taxable income for the period 1999-2014 using alternative
sample restrictions to exclude taxpayers with base-year taxable income below a certain threshold: e5,000
in the top panel and e10,000 in the bottom panel. The ETI estimates can be compared to those in
tables 3 and 4, where the base-year income restriction is zero (i.e., only include taxpayers with positive
taxable income). The specifications follow the same sequence as table 11 above: Gruber-Saez method
in columns 1-3, Kleven-Schultz method in columns 4-5 and Weber method in columns 6-7. Standard
errors clustered by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year
fixed-effects as well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children and
ascendants. Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year taxable income. Significance
levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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Table 11: ETI Estimates with Two-year and One-year Differences
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Two-year Differences
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.354*** 0.351*** 0.149*** 0.171*** 0.685*** 0.670***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.052) (0.052)
Observations 4,346,095 4,346,095 3,660,232 3,660,232 3,207,981 3,207,981
Panel B: One-year Differences
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.494*** 0.489*** 0.124*** 0.168*** 0.535*** 0.514***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.098) (0.097)
Observations 5,101,898 5,101,898 4,126,532 4,126,532 3,519,483 3,519,483
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports the elasticity of taxable income for the period 1999-2014 using alternative
difference lengths: two-year differences in the top panel and one-year differences in the bottom panel.
These estimates can be compared to the main estimates from tables 3 and 4 that use three-year differ-
ences. The specifications follow the same sequence as Table 10 above: Gruber-Saez method in columns
1-3, Kleven-Schultz method in columns 4-5 and Weber method in columns 6-7. Standard errors clus-
tered by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year fixed-effects
as well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children and ascendants.
Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year taxable income. Significance levels: *** =
1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
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A.2 Other Tax Reforms
Besides the three major reforms of the PIT, there were several legislative changes over
the period 1999-2014 that modified the set of deductions and tax credits. Among them,
the most relevant change in terms of revenue was the introduction of the stimulus tax
credit effective since mid-2008 and during 2009 (RDL 2/2008 de medidas de impulso a
la actividad económica). This tax credit consists of e400 to taxpayers obtaining labor
or business income under certain conditions. The estimated exante permanent revenue
impact of the measure was very substantial (equivalent to 0.55 percent of GDP in 2008)
in a period of large fiscal imbalances and thus was eliminated in 2010 (The Budget Law
of 2010, Ley 26/2009 de PGE de 2010 ) with an estimated exante permanent revenue
impact of 0.5 percent of GDP in 2010.
The introduction in November of 2007 (Ley 35/2007 ) of a tax credit associated to
the born or adoption of a children is among the most prominent tax credits created in
this period. This tax credit consists of a e2,500 payment per taxpayer, it was in force
until 2010 fiscal year and had an estimated exante revenue impact of 0.15 percent of
GDP in 2008.
To mitigate the effects of inflation creating progressive taxation the legislator adjusted
the tax brackets of the general tax base increasing them a 2 percent in the years 2000,
2005, 2006 and 2008. In the latter case, the price adjustment also affected personal and
family tax credits and labor income deductions with an aggregate exante permanent
impact equivalent to 0.1 percent of GDP in 2008 (The Budget Law of 2008, Ley 51/2007
de PGE de 2008 ).
In 2011, the central government introduced (The Budget Law of 2011, Ley 39/2010
de PGE de 2011 ) two additional brackets with higher marginal tax rates for top income
earners: 44 percent for taxable income in the range between e120,000 and e175,000 and
45 percent for taxable income above that amount.
The flat tax rate applied to the savings tax rate was modified along the Great Re-
cession in order to increase both its average effective taxation and its progressivity. In
A Tax Reforms: Further Details
A.1 Major Legislative Changes
The Law that regulates the Spanish personal income tax since 1999 was Ley 40/1998 del
IRPF. This Law was replaced in 2003 by Ley 46/2002 del IRPF, and the latter replaced
in 2007 by Ley 35/2006 del IRPF. The legislative package of urgent measures adopted to
address the severe fiscal imbalances of Spain in 2011 (RDL 20/2011 de medidas urgentes
en materia presupuestaria, tributaria y financiera para la corrección del déficit público)
introduced extensive changes to the PIT, effective since the fiscal year 2012.
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2010 the baseline rate increased from 18 to 19 percent with a new bracket for taxable
income above e6,000 taxed at 21 percent. The 2012 Reform introduced a surcharge of 2
percentage points in the first bracket of the savings tax base (i.e., tax rate of 21 percent)
and additional 4 percentage points (i.e., tax rate of 25 percent) for income in the second
bracket until reaching e24,000 when a new bracket was created with a tax rate of 27
percent.
A.2.1 Regional Tax Schedules
Regional governments started to slightly modify the marginal tax rates in 2007 (the first
to do so was the Madrid Region) with very modest reductions across the full tax schedule.
From 2008 to 2010 a reduced set of regions (Madrid, La Rioja, Murcia and Comunidad
Valenciana) applied lower rates across the common four brackets with small differences
with respect to the baseline schedule applied to the rest of regions. In 2011, six regions
decided to create additional brackets increasing the marginal tax rates for top income
earners. This trend towards higher differential taxation across regions was reinforced
since 2012 when eight regions present significant differential with respect to the baseline
tax rates. For instance, the Catalan government created in 2012 a top bracket that
reached 56 percent (4 percentage points higher than the baseline central bracket and 7
pp higher than the pre-reform tax rate).21
Besides of changes in the tax rate structure, regional governments introduced since
the 1990s several tax credits that either complement the ones included in the central level
(e.g., investment in habitual housing) or create new ones (e.g., education and kinder-
garten expenditures). The total amount of these tax credits have progressively increased
over time but it is still quantitatively tiny reaching an estimated impact of 0.03 per-
cent of GDP in 2014 (Dirección General de Tributos, 2019). Finally, since 2010 several
regional governments (Madrid, Cantabria and Castilla-La Mancha) have introduced en-
hancements in the tax credits associated to personal and family circumstances.
21Other regional governments also created additional tax brackets with higher marginal rates as
Andalusia (top rate of 56 percent), Asturias (top rate of 55.5 percent) or Extremadura and Cantabria
(top rates of 55 percent).
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22We omit other income sources, called imputations and attributions, from the formulas below for
simplicity, as they are distributed across the two tax bases but they represent small amounts for most
taxpayers. However, we do incorporate them in the tax calculator to compute taxable income and tax
liability.
Period 1999− 2006 : yg = yL + yB + yKR + yKF + yGS and ys = yGL
Period 2007− 2014 : yg = yL + yB + yKR and ys = yGL + yGS + yKF
Separately tracking each income source allows us to create a measure of adjusted
gross income that is homogeneous over time for the period 1999-2014.
Let yb denote the adjusted gross income (AGI) in tax base b, with b = {g, s}, where (g)
denotes the general tax base and (s) the special/savings tax base. We omit taxpayer
and time subscripts for notational simplicity. For each income source, the adjusted
gross income (AGI) consists of gross income minus income-related expenditures (i.e.,
expenses needed to obtain income), as explained in Section 3.1. We consider six main
components of income: we denote labor income with superscript L, business income
with B, financial capital income with KF , real-estate capital income with KR, short-
term capital gains with GS and long-term capital gains with GL.22 Note that long-term
capital gains are defined as those obtained from the sale of assets held for more than two
years for the period 1999-2000 and one year between 2001-2006. Between 2007 and 2012,
no distinction was made between short and long-term capital gains, and the one-year
threshold was reinstated in 2013.
In the formulas below, we differentiate between periods 1999-2006 and 2007-2014
because of the change in the definition of taxable income in the 2007 reform. Then,
adjusted gross income for each period and tax base can be written as follows:
B Tax Calculator
B.1 Definition of variables
Adjusted Gross Income
Taxable Income
We calculate taxable income zb for each tax base b = {g, s} by first subtracting from
each AGI the remaining income-specific deductions in the tax code, denoted dj for each
In this appendix, we provide more details on the tax calculator used to calculate marginal
tax rates and construct the instrumental variables. We also provide some evidence on
the calculator’s performance to accurately compute the taxable income and tax liability
for all taxpayers using detailed information from tax returns. The tax calculator is
designed to be used with the administrative panel dataset of personal income tax (IRPF
in Spanish) returns provided by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF) for the period
1999-2014. The complete Stata codes are available from the authors upon request.
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Tax liability is calculated in two steps. In the first step, the income tax schedule of
each tax base is applied to the taxable incomes defined above. Whenever tax liability
is negative, the losses are carried out to the following year as tax credits (which can
be used in the next 4 years). In period 2007-2014, the tax liability for the general
base is calculated by applying the tax schedule to taxable income and separately to the
personal and family exemption, and then subtracting the two resulting figures. For the
vast majority of taxpayers, this implies that the personal exemption reduces tax liability
at the lowest marginal rate (18 or 24 percent, depending on the year). Before 2007,
when the exemption worked as a deduction, it reduced tax liability at each taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate. Therefore, this change in the definition of taxable income in the 2007
Period 1999− 2006 : T (z) = max [0, Tg (zg) + Ts (zs)− TCN ]− TCR
Period 2007− 2014 : T (z) = max [0, Tg (zg)− Tg (fg) + Ts (zs)− TCN ]− TCR
income source j. We then aggregate the different income sources net of income-specific
deductions and substract the general deductions, denoted dgb, and also the personal and
family deductions, denoted fb. The most relevant deductions in revenue terms are those
related to labor income, the deductions originated by contributions to private pension
plans or the ones related to past negative liabilities. Note that, for the general tax base
in the period 2007-2014, the main components of the personal and family deduction, fg,
enter as a tax credit rather than a deduction, as we explain below. If taxable income
in the general base is smaller than the personal and family deduction, the remnant of
general and family deductions is applied as a deduction in the special tax base, both in
periods 1999-2006 and 2007-2014. Then, we can express taxable income as follows:
Period 1999-2006 : zg =
∑
j
{yj − dj} − dgg − fg and zs = ys − dgs − fs
Period 2007-2014 : zg =
∑
j
{yj − dj} − dgg and zs = ys − dgs − fs
where j = {L,B,KR,KF,GS} for period 1999-2006 and j = {L,B,KR,GS} for 2007-
2014.
reform introduced more progressivity in the tax schedule.
In the second step to calculate tax liability, we subtract all tax credits, denoted by
TC. Some tax credits are refundable, denoted TCR, in the sense that their application
can make tax liability negative. Some examples are the maternity-related tax credits and
the e400 stimulus given to all taxpayers in years 2008 and 2009. Some other tax credits
are non-refundable, denoted TCN , for example the mortgage interest deduction that was
in place until 2013. Then, tax liability in each period can be expressed as follows:
The calculation of marginal tax rates and the construction of the predicted-tax-rate
instruments are described in Sections 3.3 and 4.2.
Tax Liability and Tax Credits
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Appendix Figures
Figure A.1: Bunching Evidence at Kinks
(a) First Two Kinks, 2000-2002
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(b) First Two Kinks, 2003-2006
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(c) First Kink, 2007-2011
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(d) First Kink, 2012-2014
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(e) Third and Fourth Kinks, 2000-
2002
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(f) Third and Fourth Kinks, 2003-2006
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Notes: these figures show the taxable income distribution (in nominal euros) around several kinks at
low and middle income levels created by the Spanish personal income tax schedule over the period
2000-2014. A kink is defined as the taxable income threshold where taxpayers face a change in their
marginal tax rate. The distributions pool yearly data for different periods of time when the tax schedule
is identical across these fiscal years. To compute the share of taxpayers in each bin of taxable income,
we elevate each observation included in the sample using the sampling weight reported in the data. The
bins of taxable income are e200 wide. The graphs show that there is no significant bunching at any of
the kinks in the taxable income distribution over the period 2000-2014.
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Figure A.2: Bunching Evidence at Kinks
(a) Second and Third Kinks, 2007-
2011
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(b) Second and Third Kinks, 2012-
2014
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(c) Fifth Kink, 2000-2002
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(d) Fourth and Fifth Kinks, 2011-2014
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Notes: these figures show the taxable income distribution (in nominal euros) around several kinks at
middle and high income levels created by the Spanish personal income tax schedule over the period
2000-2014. A kink is defined as the taxable income threshold where taxpayers face a change in their
marginal tax rate. The distributions pool yearly data for different periods of time when the tax schedule
is identical across these fiscal years. To compute the share of taxpayers in each bin of taxable income,
we elevate each observation included in the sample using the sampling weight reported in the data. The
bins of taxable income are e200 wide, except for panel (e) where the bin width is e500 and panel (f)
where it is e1,000. The graphs show that there is no significant bunching at any of the kinks in the
taxable income distribution over the period 2000-2014.
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Tax Calculator Accuracy Rates
General Tax Base Special or Savings Tax Base
Year Taxable Income Tax Liability Taxable Income Tax Liability
1999 99.0% 98.2% 99.9% 99.8%
2000 99.5% 98.9% 100.0% 100.0%
2001 99.3% 98.6% 100.0% 100.0%
2002 99.3% 98.4% 100.0% 100.0%
2003 97.8% 98.3% 100.0% 100.0%
2004 98.7% 98.5% 100.0% 100.0%
2005 98.0% 98.6% 100.0% 100.0%
2006 97.8% 98.7% 100.0% 100.0%
2007 100.0% 99.0% 100.0% 100.0%
2008 100.0% 98.9% 99.5% 99.6%
2009 100.0% 98.9% 100.0% 100.0%
2010 100.0% 98.8% 100.0% 100.0%
2011 100.0% 98.8% 100.0% 100.0%
2012 100.0% 98.7% 100.0% 99.5%
2013 100.0% 98.6% 100.0% 99.6%
2014 100.0% 97.7% 100.0% 99.5%
Notes: this table reports the percentage of cases in which taxable income and tax liability calculated
with our tax calculator is within two percent of the actual values recorded in the administrative panel
dataset of tax returns. As can be seen in the table, the accuracy rates are a bit higher for taxable
income compared to tax liability, and also for the period 2007-2014 compared to 1999-2006. In any case,
all accuracy rates are very high, with the lowest value at 97.7 percent.
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Notes: this table reports the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) for the period 1999-2014 including lagged
splines in order to capture potential heterogeneous trends in income across groups of taxpayers during
the sample period. Columns 1-2 report the estimates of the ETI applying the Gruber-Saez estimation
method under two alternatives: lagged cubic splines (column 1) and lagged log splines (column 2).
Columns 3-4 report the estimates of the ETI using the method from Kleven and Schultz (2014) under
two alternatives: lagged cubic splines (column 3) and lagged log splines (column 4). Columns 5-6
report the estimates of the ETI using the method from Weber (2014) under two alternatives: lagged
cubic splines (column 5) and lagged log splines (column 6). Standard errors clustered by taxpayer are
reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year fixed-effects as well as controls for
age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children, ascendants and the type of taxpayer
according to her main source of income (employee, self-employed, saver or taxpayers with other main
source of income such as capital gains). Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year
taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
Table A.2: ETI Estimates including Lagged Splines
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.408*** 0.409*** 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.644*** 0.628***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.036)
Δ ln(v) 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 3,440,136 3,440,136 3,133,430 3,133,430 2,983,196 2,983,196
Diff-in-Sargan p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.20
Base-Year Splines Lag Cubic Lag Log Lag Cubic Lag Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1924
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.382*** 0.399*** 0.601*** 0.622*** 0.447*** 0.445***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.032) (0.047) (0.047)
Δ ln(v) 0.051*** 0.052***
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 1,181,998 1,181,998 1,068,836 1,068,836 1,000,069 1,000,069
Diff-in-Sargan p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.36
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.4: ETI Estimates including Pensioners
Table A.3: ETI Estimates in the Balanced Panel
Notes: this table reports the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) for the period 1999-2014 using the
balanced panel of taxpayers included in the sample. Columns 1-2 report the estimates of the ETI
applying the Gruber-Saez estimation method under two alternatives: cubic splines (column 1) and log
splines (column 2). Columns 3-4 report the estimates of the ETI using the method from Kleven and
Schultz (2014) under two alternatives: cubic splines (column 3) and log splines (column 4). Columns
5-6 report the estimates of the ETI using the method from Weber (2014) under two alternatives: lagged
cubic splines (column 5) and lagged log splines (column 6). Standard errors clustered by taxpayer are
reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year fixed-effects as well as controls for
age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children, ascendants and the type of taxpayer
according to her main source of income (employee, self-employed, saver or taxpayers with other main
source of income such as capital gains). Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year
taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
Notes: this table reports the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) for the period 1999-2014 considering
pensioner taxpayers included in the sample. Columns 1-2 report the estimates of the ETI applying
the Gruber-Saez estimation method under two alternatives: cubic splines (column 1) and log splines
(column 2). Columns 3-4 report the estimates of the ETI using the method from Kleven and Schultz
(2014) under two alternatives: cubic splines (column 3) and log splines (column 4). Columns 5-6
report the estimates of the ETI using the method from Weber (2014) under two alternatives: lagged
cubic splines (column 5) and lagged log splines (column 6). Standard errors clustered by taxpayer are
reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year fixed-effects as well as controls for
age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children, ascendants and the type of taxpayer
according to her main source of income (employee, self-employed, saver or taxpayers with other main
source of income such as capital gains). Observations in all regressions are weighted by log base-year
taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.429*** 0.419*** 0.586*** 0.584*** 0.625*** 0.612***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) (0.032)
Δ ln(v) 0.037*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 4,516,638 4,516,638 3,980,947 3,980,947 3,404,067 3,404,067
Diff-in-Sargan p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.79
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Gruber-Saez Kleven-Schultz Weber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ ln(1− τ) 0.353*** 0.340*** 0.547*** 0.541*** 0.634*** 0.617***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.036)
Δ ln(v) 0.043*** 0.043***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 3,956,894 3,956,894 3,490,996 3,490,996 2,946,864 2,946,864
Diff-in-Sargan p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.27
Base-Year Splines Cubic Log Cubic Log Lag Cubic Lag Log
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: this table reports the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) for the period 1999-2014 excluding
taxpayers that changed their regional fiscal residence in any year included in the sample period. Columns
1-2 report the estimates of the ETI applying the Gruber-Saez estimation method under two alternatives:
cubic splines (column 1) and log splines (column 2). Columns 3-4 report the estimates of the ETI using
the method from Kleven and Schultz (2014) under two alternatives: cubic splines (column 3) and log
splines (column 4). Columns 5-6 report the estimates of the ETI using the method from Weber (2014)
under two alternatives: lagged cubic splines (column 5) and lagged log splines (column 6). Standard
errors clustered by taxpayer are reported in parentheses. All specifications include regional and year
fixed-effects as well as controls for age, age squared, gender and indicators for joint filing, children,
ascendants and the type of taxpayer according to her main source of income (employee, self-employed,
saver or taxpayers with other main source of income such as capital gains). Observations in all regressions
are weighted by log base-year taxable income. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%.
Table A.5: ETI Estimates excluding Regional Movers
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